

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1491

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 0998

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATION: PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 1974

BEGIN SUMMARY: MBFR PLENARY MEETING TOOK PLACE ON
5 FEBRUARY 1974 UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES)
AND HEARD A STATEMENT FROM SOVIET REP KHLESTOV. KHLESTOV'S
STATEMENT WAS PRESENTED IN A NON-POLEMICAL AND MODERATE TONE.
IT STRESSED TWO "KEY" ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL
WHICH KHLESTOV SAID WERE NOT REFLECTED IN WESTERN PROPOSALS.
ONE, THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST REDUCE SIMULTANEOUSLY
FROM THE OUTSET, BECAUSE ONLY IN THIS MANNER COULD THE GOOD
WILL AND DESIRE OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FOR DETENTE BE
DEMONSTRATED. OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, ONLY US HAD INDICATED
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WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE FROM OUTSET; REPS OF OTHER WESTERN

DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO DEFER NOT ONLY REDUCTIONS OF THEIR FORCES, BUT EVEN DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS TO SOME INDEFINITE FUTURE DATE. SECONDLY, REDUCTIONS MUST INCLUDE GROUND, AIR AND NUCLEAR CAPABLE FORCES BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF ALL FORCES. KHLESTOV REPEATED THE EASTERN CLAIM THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE WARSAW PACT. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. THE SOVIET DELEGATION, IN ITS STATEMENTS BEFORE THE BREAK CLARIFYING THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE JOINT DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE USSR OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973, AND IN ANALYZING THE PROPOSALS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES PRESENTED IN THEIR WORKING DOCUMENT OF 22 NOVEMBER 1973, POINTED OUT THE DIVERGENCE OF THE TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: THE APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE DELEGATION OF THE USSR AND THE DELEGATIONS OF THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SHOWED WHY THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE.

2. WE HAVE CAREFULLY FAMILIARIZED OURSELVES WITH THE STATEMENTS OF THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF OUR WORK, BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, HAVE NOT DISCOVERED ANY NEW ELEMENTS IN THEM WHICH WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE A SEARCH FOR CONCRETE SOLUTIONS TO THE KEY QUESTIONS.

3. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A POSITION WHICH IN EFFECT PURSUES A QUITE DEFINITE AIM: OBTAINING MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

4. WE HAVE ALREADY STATED, AND WISH TO DO SO AGAIN WITH GREAT CLARITY, THAT ONE SHOULD RENOUNCE ANY ILLUSIONS ON THAT SCORE. THE SOVIET UNION, LIKE THE OTHER SOCIALIST STATES WHICH ARE COAUTHORS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, ARE NOT SEEKING ANY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND, OF COURSE, WILL NOT PERMIT THE OTHER SIDE TO GAIN THEM. IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT AN

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AGREEMENT WILL BE WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD IN FACT LEAD TO A UNILATERAL DIMINUTION OF THE DEFENCE CAPACITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WE WOULD LIKE TO DWELL TODAY ON TWO QUESTIONS.

6. FIRST OF ALL WE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO CALL ATTENTION

TO A QUESTION WHICH HAS NOW ASSUMED KEY SIGNIFICANCE IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS THE QUESTION OF SEEING THAT ALL ELEVEN
STATES PARTICIPATING IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS ENGAGE FROM THE VERY
BEGINNING IN REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

7. IN FAVOURING SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION OF FOREIGN AS WELL AS
NATIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF MILITARY DETENTE IS OUR COMMON CAUSE. THE
SITUATION CANNOT ARISE IN WHICH ONLY CERTAIN STATES WHICH ARE
POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN AGREEMENTS WOULD ENGAGE IN REDUCTION
OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, WHILE OTHERS WOULD NOT BE TOUCHED BY
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
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9. IN MAINTAINING THE NECESSITY OF THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL
ELEVEN STATES IN THE PROCESS OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES
AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THE
SOCIALIST STATES ARE CONVINCED THAT ONLY BY PURSUING SUCH A PATH
WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO ENSURE IN THE BEST WAY THE ADHERENCE TO
THAT MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE ON WHICH OUR NEGOTIATIONS ARE BASED,
NAMELY UNDIMINSHED SECURITY FOR EACH SIDE.

10. PROCEEDING FROM THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS, THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROVIDES FOR REDUCTION OF BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL STATES HAVING THE STATUS OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE THE TIMES AND SCOPE OF THE REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS FOR EACH SUCH STATE ARE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED. IN THE DRAFT THERE ARE NO RESERVATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE PHASING AND SEQUENCE OF

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REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE REDUCTION, THAT IS FROM 1975, AND IN THE COURSE OF THIS WHOLE PROCESS, ALL ELEVEN STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE REDUCING THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS UNDER EQUAL CONDITIONS.

11. IN PRESENTING THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, ITS COAUTHORS THE GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND THE USSR CLEARLY STATED THAT THEY ARE READY TO IMPLEMENT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY, AND CALLED UPON THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO DECLARE LIKEWISE THAT THEY ARE READY TO ENGAGE IN THE REDUCTION OF THEIR TROOPS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREED CONCRETE PROGRAMME.

12. WHAT HAVE WE HEARD IN REPLY? OF THE SEVEN WESTERN STATES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN AN AGREEMENT ONLY THE UNITED STATES ARE DISPLAYING READINESS TO BE INCLUDED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IN THE PROCESS OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES. AS FOR THE REMAINING WESTERN STATES, THEY, AS IS EVIDENT FROM THE SPEECHES OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, STILL AVOID CLEAR PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THIS SCORE, AND TRY TO DEFER NOT ONLY THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT ALSO DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION TO SOME LATER AND UNDEFINED PERIOD.

13. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE INDICATED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF A PART OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET ARMED FORCES FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IS "THE SIMPLEST AND MOST PRACTICAL" APPROACH. ONE CANNOT HELP ASKING WHY IT IS EASIER TO WITHDRAW FROM CENTRAL EUROPE POWERFUL CONTINGENTS OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET FORCES, WHICH WOULD ADD UP OVERALL TO TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MEN AND A LARGE QUANTITY OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT, THAN TO REDUCE A FAR SMALLER QUANTITY OF TROOPS FROM THE BRITISH RHINE ARMY OR, LET US SAY, TO WITHDRAW A FEW HUNDRED MEN FROM THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES, OR TO REDUCE BELGIAN TROOPS? WHERE IS THE LOGIC IN THIS?

14. IN THE US REPRESENTATIVE'S SPEECH OF 24 JANUARY IT WAS SAID THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET TROOPS WOULD CAUSE "LESS POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS" THAN THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF OTHER STATES WHICH ARE PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS. WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHAT SPECIFIC PROBLEMS ARE CONCERNED HERE OR

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HOW ONE CAN CITE SOME POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES OR OTHER NOW, WHEN THE GROUP OF STATES WHOSE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ARE TO BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS WAS DETERMINED IN THE COURSE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

15. ONE GETS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, SOME OF WHICH HAVE VERY POWERFUL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, ARE NOW TRYING UNDER VARIOUS PRETEXTS TO EVADE REDUCING THEIR FORCES. IF THIS IS NOT THE CASE, WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BRITIAN, THE FRG AND THE OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS DECLARATIONS THAT THEY TOO ARE READY TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WITH SOME INDICATION OF WHEN AND IN WHAT QUANTITY THEY WILL DO THIS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO COUNT ON SUCCESSFUL PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT THE INTRODUCTION OF FULL CLARITY ON THIS QUESTION.

16. MR CHAIRMAN, ANOTHER QUESTION ON WHICH THE ATTAINMENT OF FULL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IS REQUIRED IS WELL KNOWN. IT CONCERNS THE FACT THAT ALL THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES WHICH ARE SITUATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THAT IS GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND ALSO UNITS AND SUB-UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ADVANCED APPROPRIATE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF SUCH AN APPROACH. NONE THE LESS WE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO PAUSE ONCE MORE ON THIS QUESTION.

17. IN THE COURSE OF LENGTHY DIPLOMA
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OF GREAT BRITAIN IN HIS SPEECH OF 31 JANUARY EVENT STATED IN JUSTIFICATION OF SUCH AN APPROACH THAT "EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE NUCLEAR FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA IN QUESTION WOULD NOT IN ITSELF DIRECTLY FURTHER THE REDUCTION OF THE DANGER OF THE OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, IN THAT BOTH SIDES POSSESS STILL MORE POWERFUL NUCLEAR FORCES OUTSIDE THIS AREA."

20. SUCH A CONCLUSION DOES NOT STAND UP TO CRITICISM. WE ARE CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS ON A REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AGREED AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE, KNOWING FULL WELL THAT BEYOND ITS BOUNDARIES BOTH SIDES ALSO DISPOSE OF OTHER TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS INCLUDING SOME WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONSIDER POSSIBLE FOR INCLUSION IN AN AGREEMENT.

21. THERE EXIST SERIOUS REASONS WHICH INSISTENTLY DICTATE
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THE NECESSITY OF REDUCING THE NUCLEAR POTENTIAL IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH THEIR ENORMOUS DESTRUCTIVE FORCE IN THIS EXTREMELY THICKLY POPULATED AREA IS NOT ONLY HIGHLY DANGEROUS, BUT IS ONE OF THE SERIOUS SOURCES OF TENSION. THE EXCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM A FUTURE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD NOT ONLY LEAD TO INCREASE OF THEIR RELATIVE WEIGHT IN THE GENERAL COMPLEX OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, BUT WOULD ALSO PRESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FURTHER GROWTH OF THIS WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION. WE ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT LEAVING OUT OF REDUCTION WEAPONS WHICH INVOLVE THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE POPULATION OF EUROPEAN STATES WOULD BE IN NO WAY JUSTIFIED AND WOULD INEVITABLY EVOKE SERIOUS ANXIETY IN EUROPEAN AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

22. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES OPPOSING THE REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ALSO LOOK UNCONVINCING AND ARTIFICIAL. THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAY THAT SINCE THEY ARE A HIGHLY MOBILE TYPE OF ARMED FORCE, AIR FORCES CAN BE EASILY REINTRODUCED INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND THAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY DISCUSSION OF

THE RELATIVE TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL DATA OF AIRCRAFT ETC.

23. IT IS HARD TO ASSESS SUCH ARGUMENTS OTHERWISE THAN AS AN ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY AN INDEFENSIBLE POSITION ON THIS QUESTION. WHO WILL VENTURE TO DENY THAT IN MODERN CONDITIONS AVIATION PLAYS NO LESS IMPORTANT A ROLE THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, GROUND FORCES? ONE ALSO MUST NOT FORGET THAT IF AIRCRAFT THEMSELVES POSSESS MOBILITY, THERE IS IN THE EQUIPMENT OF AIR FORCES A LARGE QUANTITY OF EQUIPMENT WHOSE MOBILITY ROUGHLY CORRESPONDS TO THE MOBILITY OF THE EQUIPMENT OF GROUND FORCES, BUT WITHOUT WHICH AIR FORCES CANNOT CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO THEM. MOREOVER, ONE CAN SAY WITH FULL JUSTIFICATION THAT IT IS THIS VERY QUALITY OF AIR FORCES WHICH, BY PERMITTING THEIR SPEEDY BUILD-UP IN ANY AREA, DEMANDS THE INCLUSION OF THIS TYPE OF ARMED FORCES IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION.

24. THE SOVIET DELEGATION DOES NOT INTEND TO BE DRAWN INTO A DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT OF WHAT TYPE OF ARMED FORCES OR ARMAMENTS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ALTHOUGH
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WE ALSO COULD, FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, TAKE SOME ONE TYPE OF ARMED FORCES OR ARMAMENTS AND SPEAK, FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE REDUCTION ONLY OF AIR FORCES OR ONLY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT SUCH A COURSE DIVERTS US FROM THE SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE TASK BEFORE US.

25. IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF WESTERN COUNTRIES TALK A GREAT DEAL OF THE POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER OF TRANSFERRING ARMED FORCES TO THE CENTRE OF EUROPE WITH THE AIM OF BUILDING UP THEIR FORCES IN PARTICULAR CRISIS SITUATIONS. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CAME TO VIENNA WITH ONE PURPOSE - TO WORK OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE STEPS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH WOULD PERMIT A LESSENING OF THE RISK OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE.

26. IF INSTEAD OF THIS WE TURN TO THE COURSE OF CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASE OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WE WILL START OUT DEFINING WHO NEEDS HOW MUCH TIME TO TRANSFER THEIR TROOPS FROM WHERE INTO THIS AREA; IF WE ARE GOING TO BE EXAMINING THE PROBLEM OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF TROOPS THROUGH THE PRISM OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS, IT WILL IN NO WAY FACILITATE OUR WORK. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WILL ONLY DAMAGE OUR CAUSE.

27. IN CONCLUSION WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROPOSE TO AGREE ON MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE CONTRIBUTION TO GUARANTEEING MILITARY DETENTE AND STRENGTHENING ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY. THEREFORE WE CONSISTENTLY

ADVOCATE SUCH REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AS WOULD ENCOMPASS BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL STATES IN WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT IS TO SAY GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES, AND UNITS AND SUB-UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

28. THE JOINT DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS A REALISTIC AND CLEAR PROGRAMME FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH REDUCTIONS. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT NO STATE WOULD LOSE FROM THE PUTTING INTO EFFECT OF THIS PROGRAMME, AND THE CAUSE OF STRENGTHENING PEACE IN EUROPE WOULD GAIN. ALL STATES
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WHICH ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD HAVE AN EQUAL INTEREST IN SUCH AN OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS WHAT THE PEOPLES OF ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE EXPECT FROM US. END TEXT. HUMES

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